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American Politics Research 40(6) compare Oregon to other states may attribute the higher level of turnout to VBM, when it may in fact be a product of other features of Oregon's demographic makeup and political culture.
The second reason to wonder about the generalizability of the results is that the circumstances surrounding the first three vote-by-mail elections were unique. The primary (December 1995) and general (January 1996) Senate contests attracted considerable local and national media attention because they were special elections to replace a Senator, Bob Packwood, resigning during his term due to charges of sexual harassment and ethics violations. The March 1996 presidential preference primary was a "beauty contest" with no delegates at stake-the only time Oregon had ever held such a contest. These conditions raise the possibility that the high turnout in these elections was a function of the political circumstances of the three elections rather than a product of administrative reform.
Third, the 2000 paper needs to be reevaluated because Southwell herself has called it into question. In two recent articles Southwell reports variously that VBM has a statistically significant impact on turnout only in primaries and special elections (Southwell, 2009, p. 214) or only in special elections (Southwell, 2010, p. 110) . 6 Laying the three articles next to one another, the number of elections, specifications, and conclusions are difficult to reconcile. We remark more on these inconsistencies later, and believe that this provides a strong rationale for an independent reexamination of the results.
VBM remains a hot topic in the election reform community. Unlike in 2000, when only a small number of states had either full VBM or no-excuse absentee balloting, 30 states and the District of Columbia now have these systems, 7 and legislation is regularly proposed in Congress that would mandate no-excuse absentee balloting for all federal elections. 8 Scholars have noted that no-excuse absentee voting systems experience much higher "ballot leakage" (Stewart, 2011) and "residual vote" (Gronke, Stewart, & Hicks, 2010) rates, while other critics point to the use of absentee ballots as a way commit fraud (Fund, 2008; Minnite, 2010 , for a contrasting view). Nationwide, voters who cast a ballot by mail express lower levels of confidence that their vote will be counted as cast (Alvarez, Hall, & Llewellyn, 2008) , and even in Oregon and Washington, those who remain opposed to vote by mail have less confidence than supporters (Stewart, 2011) . Given the ongoing controversy, it is critical that we understand as fully as possible the costs and consequences of this policy reform. Thus, this article seeks to replicate Southwell and Burchett's findings, to extend the original analysis through the 2010 general election, and to test for the possibility of "novelty effects" in the first few VBM contests.
A Brief History of VBM in Oregon
Oregon adopted VBM as a local option in 1987. VBM was first used on a statewide basis to administer a 1993 special election.
9 By 1996, debates over VBM were in full force, but state legislators were wary of changing the rules of the electoral game. For elections officials, such as Secretary of State Phil Keisling, administering a "two-track" election system had become an administrative headache. Well over 80% of Oregonians were already voting via the absentee ballot, and Keisling (among others) saw no reason not to switch to a fully VBM system. The resignation of Senator Packwood gave Keisling the opportunity he needed; he ruled by administrative decree that the statewide elections to replace Packwood would be conducted entirely by mail. Furthermore, because the 1996 presidential primary in Oregon was a "beauty contest" that did not allocate delegates, Keisling also had the authority to administer this election by mail. Thus, the first elections for a candidate for public office administered by mail were (a) the special Senate primary in December 1995, (b) a special Senate general election in January 1996, and (c) a presidential preference contest in March 1996. After two unsuccessful attempts by the state legislature to implement the reform, VBM was adopted for all elections after the citizenry passed Measure 60 in November 1998.
A first cut at assessing the role of VBM in boosting turnout is a simple visual inspection of turnout trends, and this does not lend much support to the claim that VBM boosted turnout. Figure 1 displays turnout rates in general elections in Oregon from 1960 to 2010. The vertical line at 1998 indicates when VBM was adopted for all statewide races. The January 1996 special Senate electionwith the third lowest rate of voter turnout among the elections in the figure-is also indicated in relation to other elections in the time period. The best-fit lines indicate turnout in presidential and midterm election years has remained fairly stable at 81% and 71%, respectively, since 1960. The special Senate election sits, relative to the best-fit lines, slightly below the average turnout in midterm elections.
Figure 2 displays turnout rates for primary elections, the special Senate primary, and the 1996 presidential primary for the same time period. Voter turnout in these elections has steadily declined over time. This figure highlights the distinctiveness of the 1995 Senate primary and 1996 presidential beauty contest, both of which deviate substantially from the trend line as well as the most proximate primary elections. The adoption of VBM does not appear to have affected the trend appreciably, although the 2008 primary election had about the same level of voter participation as the 1996 presidential primary (58.3% and 57.6%, respectively). One simple method to examine the link between turnout and VBM is to compare turnout in the first three VBM elections with average turnout in comparable elections from the 1960 to 1996 period. In the special Senate primary turnout was 57.9%-compared to 47.4% in the seven Senate primaries without a presidential race on the ballot. Turnout in the special Senate general election was 66.3%-the average turnout in the six Senate general elections without a presidential race is 71.2%. Finally, the turnout in the 1996 presidential primary was 57.6%-compared to an average turnout of 62.2% in the three presidential primaries without a Senate race on the ballot. The special Senate general and 1996 presidential primary show a lower level of turnout than the comparable set of elections.
10 It is difficult to ascribe a positive turnout effect to VBM given these comparative statics.
11
Our dataset includes 24 elections conducted at times other than May or November. Figure 3 graphs the turnout in these special elections (11 conducted with polling places and 13 by VBM) between 1960 and 2010. These elections, given varying subject matter and electoral salience, exhibit higher variability in turnout than either general or primary elections. Here, visual inspection reveals a potential impact of VBM: special elections conducted entirely by mail tended to have higher turnout than elections conducted before the 1993 transition.
12 But, because of the varying subject matter of the ballot measures, it is not entirely clear that the increase in turnout in special elections is due solely to the implementation of VBM.
In summary, visual inspection of the turnout trends over time does not lend much support to a claim that VBM stimulated turnout in Oregon. Oregon was a high turnout state before VBM was adopted in 1998 and continues to be a high turnout state.
VBM and Turnout: A Review of the Literature
A second cut at assessing the role of VBM in boosting turnout is to examine other research. A close reading of this scholarship leads us to conclude that Southwell and Burchett's finding may be an outlier. Previous work (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, & Miller, 2007) that considered all types of early voting reforms estimated that VBM increased turnout by 4.7 percentage points in presidential and midterm elections in the 1980 to 2004 period.
13 Richey (2008) finds that VBM is associated with a positive effect, and of the same magnitude as Southwell and Burchett, but this may be a result of higher rates of voting in Oregon when compared to the rest of the United States, as noted earlier.
Another study found no turnout effects of unrestricted absentee voting, early in-person voting, or mobile in-person voting, but did not include VBM in the estimated model (Fitzgerald, 2005) . While it was once true that VBM was a "uniquely American form of election administration" (Hamilton, 1988, p. 860) , VBM has been used in other nations with a modest turnout effect. A study of Swiss voters (Luechinger, Rosinger, & Stutzer, 2007 ) finds a turnout effect of 4.1 percentage points from 1970 to 2005. In one study where VBM is found to decrease turnout, the effect is also small. Kousser and Mullin (2007) analyze results from two general elections in California and find that VBM decreases turnout by 2.6 to 2.9 percentage points in general elections, but increase turnout in local elections by 7 percentage points. Furthermore, Giammo and Brox (2010) find any turnout effect of either VBM or early in-person voting is due to novelty of the reform and not sustained over time. These studies reinforce the claim that liberalized ballot access leads to a marginal change in turnout.
14 Other studies develop a more nuanced claim: that VBM stabilizes turnout by retaining wavering, infrequent voters but does not bring new voters into the system (Berinsky, Burns, & Traugott, 2001; Karp & Banducci, 2000) . According to this argument, there is a segment of the population that will not turn out to vote for almost any reason. VBM does not induce these voters to participate, but may transform occasional voters into frequent voters. Resource-rich voters tend to vote more frequently, and are more likely to become frequent voters in a VBM system.
A review of the existing literature indicates that VBM is associated with an increase in turnout, but its effect is modest in magnitude. Both the literature review and a visual inspection of turnout data in Oregon indicate that the 10 percentage point effect found by Southwell and Burchett is potentially an outlier, and should be reexamined in light of fourteen additional years of experience with VBM in Oregon.
Data and Methods
In this section we replicate, as closely as possible, Southwell and Burchett's original findings. First, we extend the time-series dataset to include 14 additional years of Oregon elections. This is done to test for potential novelty effects of the reform. Second, we explore the possibility that the turnout effects of VBM are primarily evident in low-profile, low-interest contests, a pattern in line with the model of turnout as low-cost, low-benefit activity (Aldrich, 1993) . We do so by adding all special (noncandidate ballot initiatives and referenda) elections to our dataset.
In their 2000 article, Southwell and Burchett analyze 48 candidate elections between 1960 and 1996. 15 Of these elections, the three 1995 and 1996 elections identified earlier were conducted by mail. We originally hoped to append elections conducted since 1996 onto the original dataset, but were unable to obtain the original data from the authors. Consequently, we have independently collected data on all elections conducted in Oregon since 1960. 16 The complete data series, including all sources and coding, is included in the appendix.
The original authors include independent dummy variables to control for the type of election (primary or general), the races included in the election (presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial), the use of VBM, and a measure of competitiveness.
17 To demarcate those elections with a high rate of absentee voting (>50%) before the statewide adoption of VBM, they added a dummy variable for these "mixed" elections where the state was effectively running two voting systems in parallel: a system of polling places for voters who chose to vote on Election Day, and an absentee by mail system for voters opting to mail their ballot to the elections offices around the state. We reproduce these measures in our dataset, and code the 1996 and 1998 primary and general elections and the two 1997 special elections as mixed, based on absentee usage reported in the results of those elections.
Southwell and Burchett employ Beach-MacKinnon feasible generalized least squares to control for autocorrelation in the data (Beach & MacKinnon, 1978) . 18 We question this methodological choice. We find only weak indications of autocorrelation in the data, for both the 1960 to 1996 subset and the full dataset. 19 In order to remain as true to the original study as possible, but also use the appropriate methodology, we employ two different estimation techniques. 20 These are: We then broaden the scope of the analysis to include a study of all statewide elections during the 1960 to 2010 period, including special elections (all ballot referrals and initiatives). While these variations are relatively elaborate, we think these are essential in order to fairly replicate the original analysis, account for the likely lower turnout in special elections, and to isolate any potential novelty effects of VBM.
Replication Results
The findings of Southwell and Burchett and our replication of the 1960 to 1996 and 1960 to 2010 data are shown in Table 1 . The most direct comparison, we believe, is between column one and column three-Southwell and Burchett's table 1 and our Prais-Winsten estimates for the same period. Two things are evident from this first set of results. First, we are unable to fully replicate Southwell and Burchett's findings. The OLS results are closest to their estimates, but the Prais-Winsten estimation, which should replicate their FGLS results, produces only a small and statistically indiscernible impact of VBM on turnout. Using the full dataset, we continue to find a nonsignificant impact of VBM on turnout.
Our inability to replicate the original finding is troubling. We and the original authors are working from the same set of data-Oregon electoral statistics since 1960-but our findings, in large part, refute the original claim that VBM increases turnout.
It is possible, of course, that we have misunderstood or misestimated the model in some way-the different observation counts may indicate as muchbut a manual inspection of the data series from this period provides support for our model and casts further doubt on the original estimation (because all the variables other than election competitiveness are dummy variables, making these comparisons is straightforward). The average turnout in elections without a presidential, senatorial, or gubernatorial race on the ballot between 1960 and 1996 was 40.9%. Turnout in year where there was a presidential contest averaged 71%. This 31 percentage point boost is virtually identical to what we report in columns two and three of Table 2 . Adding a gubernatorial contest increases turnout to 58.3%, again nearly identical to our estimates. These comparisons strengthen our confidence that our estimates are accurate.
We now turn to the full set of all elections, including the special elections, to test our hypotheses that (1) any turnout effect of VBM in Oregon is due to a novelty effect and (2) that the turnout effect of VBM will be higher in special elections. We elaborate on the previous model by capturing novelty effects directly.
The first panel in Table 2 demonstrates a novelty effect when the full set of elections is included in the analysis. The boost to turnout observed in the first three VBM elections is larger than the original finding presented by Southwell and Burchett. 21 Importantly, we find no statistically discernible impact of VBM on turnout after the first three elections. The second column in Table 2 includes a dummy variable for special elections as well as interactive terms for the use of VBM in special and primary elections. Here, the data indicate a substantial turnout boost associated with the first three VBM elections, on the order of 15 percentage points. Second, we find that special elections (importantly, not including the two special Senate elections) display turnout 22 percentage points below the average general election. It is in the specials where we find a notable impact of VBM, reducing the turnout decline by about 11 percentage points. These effects are maintained regardless of whether we use OLS or Prais-Winsten.
Thus far, we have operationalized turnout as the proportion of registered voters casting a ballot. A second common conceptualization of turnout is based on the voting-age population, regardless of registration status. Other scholars have developed a third measure of turnout, measuring the "voting eligible" population that participates in an election (McDonald & Popkin, 2001 ). There is some reason to conclude an alternate measure of turnout may be appropriate in Oregon, as registered Democratic voters are more likely to be moved to the list of inactive voters by Republican election officials than fellow Republican voters (Dyck & Seabrook, 2009 ). To test the robustness of our results thus far, we estimate two additional models of turnout in Oregon using voting-age and voting-eligible population estimates. Table 2 includes these results. These results do not differ greatly from our main argument, that VBM has not increased turnout in Oregon.
Conclusion
Since the election debacle of 2000, election administration in the United States has come under scrutiny by advocates, academics, and legislators at both the state and federal levels. One commonly suggested reform is VBM. Following the lead of Oregon, VBM will, its supporters claim, lower costs, improve efficiency, and increase voter turnout. We have focused on this last claim, attempting to replicate and extend one of the most commonly cited results, Southwell and Burchett's (2000) article showing a 10 percentage point boost in turnout after the adoption of VBM.
We examined the result in three ways. First, we provided graphical displays of turnout in Oregon. Visual inspection revealed that the first three VBM elections were clearly outliers from long-term trends in turnout in the state. Second, we reviewed other academic studies of VBM, most of which showed a significant but small (2% to 4%) bump in turnout. Finally, we attempted as best we could to replicate and extend the results. Our analytical results demonstrated that the original 10 percentage point finding was a consequence of a novelty effect of the first three VBM contests and was not a long-term effect of the new voting system. Our final analysis shows that any turnout effects of VBM are most likely limited to subfederal contests, precisely where voter interest is lowest and the relative impact of a minor lowering of the costs of voting would be greatest.
Appendix
In the interests of transparent and reproducible research, we felt it necessary to provide open access to the data we collected in the course of this project examining the effect of VBM in Oregon elections. We provide the data in tabular form in this appendix and can provide a Stata dataset to users upon request. 1962, 1966, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, and 1996 . The six Senate generals without a presidential race are 1962, 1966, 1974, 1978, 1986, and 1990 . The three presidential primaries without a Senate race are 1964, 1976, and 1988. 11 . These three figures are, in our mind, an important caveat to recent testimony given by Oregon Secretary of State Kate Brown before the Postal Commission, in which she claimed that VBM increases turnout, particularly in small, lower profile elections (Brown, 2010) . It is possible that this statement is accurate with respect to specials, and we have not to date collected information on state legislative, county, or municipal contests, but with respect to statewide elections, the statement is not accurate. 12. As noted, Southwell came to the same conclusion in her two most published pieces (Southwell, 2009 (Southwell, , 2010 , which shows that voting by mail increases turnout in Oregon only in special elections, but she finds no statistically significant impact of VBM in presidential, primary, or off-year elections (Southwell, 2009, p. 214) . 13. Because only Oregon has voting by mail in the time period considered by this research, the estimate was essentially an estimate of the effect of VBM in that state, independent of the other covariates included in the model. 14. Another outlier study is that of David Magleby, who conducted one of the first studies of VBM, and found a turnout effect of 19% (Magelby, 1987) . We surmise the Magleby's work, which compares turnout from 1980 to 1984 in Oregon, Washington, and California may provide insight into how voting by mail, and by implication, other convenience voting reforms, interact with campaign intensity to affect turnout. The only elections in which voting by mail was legal during this period was for some local and special (ballot measure) elections, so essentially
Magleby is comparing apples and oranges-voting by mail in local and ballot measures to turnout in federal elections where voting by mail was not allowed. In order to precisely estimate the effect of voting by mail on, say, a local election, we need to compare a federal election and a local election, both of which are administered under voting by mail. 15. In the abstract of the paper and (Southwell & Burchett, 2000, p. 73 ). We are not sure which is the correct number; we find 38 candidate elections occurred between 1960 and 1996. Multiple cuts at the data indicate to us that they must have unwittingly included special elections in the original dataset; however, including these still does not result in 48 cases. 16. Professor Southwell generously provided a dataset covering a different time period , but after independent coding, we differed with her both on the number of elections that were conducted during this period and also on the coding of some elections. Our count of the total number of statewide elections conducted from 1960 to 1996 is 38, excluding the three VBM specials in 1995/1996. If we count elections from 1960 to 1996 and include all elections, including all specials, our total count is 54, which is closer but not equal to the total reported in the 2000 article. We include special elections in our model in Table 1 because these results are a closer replication of the original findings than a model that excludes special elections. In addition, diagnostic tests described later make it clear that Southwell and Burchett must have included special elections. We have not focused on the 2009 and 2010 papers for reasons noted in the introduction, but the election totals in those papers also do not correspond to our data, and we were unable to obtain these data from Professor Southwell. 17. The original authors operationalize competitiveness as "the percentage difference between the winner and the candidate finishing second in the statewide race on the ballot with the largest number of ballots cast" (Southwell & Burchett, 2000, p. 75) . However, this really describes the noncompetitiveness of the election in question as low values of this measure actually indicate a close race. We quantify competition in general and special elections as: are the vote totals for the winner and runner-up, respectively, and B is the total ballots cast in the race with the most ballots cast. For primary elections, we adapt the above formula to account for intraparty competition: where D and R subscripts apply to the Democratic and Republican candidates, respectively. Competition is scaled from 0 to 1; 1 indicates an electoral result where the vote was evenly split between two candidates or issues (as competitive as possible) and 0 indicates a case where one candidate or ballot measure captured every vote (no competition). In our data, competitiveness ranges between 0.117 and 0.998.
18. Prais-Winsten is analogous to Beach-MacKinnon and is readily available in current statistical packages (Beach-MacKinnon is unavailable in any current statistical program with which we are familiar). 19. The Durbin-Watson statistic in both the subset and full dataset is between the lower and upper critical values, an inconclusive result, although close to the upper bound indicating positive autocorrelation. 20. We test for first-order autocorrelation in each of our models. We present both OLS and Prais-Winsten estimates because most of the tests for autocorrelation are inconclusive. 21. One reason we do not observe a turnout effect of VBM in Table 1 , but do see an effect in Table 2 is that, as Figure 2 makes clear, the 1995 special Senate primary and the 1996 presidential primary exhibited higher turnout than average, even when considering subsequent VBM elections.
